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Book Reviews 
"HE'LL TAKE HIS STAND" 
DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL. By Mark A. Graber. 1 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 
264. $40.00. 
Ken I. Kersch 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mark Graber's Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional 
Evil will strike many as one of the more Mephistophelian sallies 
of constitutional thought published in quite some time. In its 
dense, tightly argued pages, Graber stumps for the infamous ma-
jority opinion of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney in Scott v. 
Sanford (1857), and assaults what (these days, at least) is an un-
wonted bete noire: the constitutional thought of Abraham Lin-
coln. Although this book is good history, drawing extensively on 
primary source research, Graber's interest in Dred Scott is in-
strumental and theoretical. He uses the case as a vehicle for 
questioning the legal academy's conventional wisdom concern-
ing what constitutions are, what they do. how we (and judges) 
should interpret them. At the top of Graber's target list are con-
stitutional theorists, be they liberal "perfectionists" or conserva-
tive originalists. As Graber sees it. while these two camps dis-
l. Professor. Department of Government & Politics. University of Maryland. 
2. Director. Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy. and Asso-
ciate Professor of Political Science. History. and Law. Boston College. Thanks to the 
members of a panel on Graber's book at the Annual Meeting of the New England Politi-
cal Science Association (May 2007). Mark Graber. Mark Tushnet. and Beau Breslin. for 
a stimulating discussion. as well as to Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn. Ronald Kahn. George 
Thomas. and Keith Whittington. 
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agree over both method and results, they are united in their 
commitment to theorizing the single best way to interpret the 
constitutional text, and to fixing the right meaning of particular 
constitutional provisions. 
Ever the pugalist in fighting form, Graber attacks the per-
fectionists not at the weakest but at their strongest point. He 
alights upon the Dred Scott case, not for its intrinsic interest, but 
precisely because the rejection of the "best" possible interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision here has the worst possible 
consequences: pure and unadulterated evil. 3 If the "best'' inter-
pretation is off-limits in countering human bondage, he asks im-
plicitly, when would it ever be in limits? 
Perfectionist constitutional theorists like James Fleming, 
Christopher Eisgruber, and Ronald Dworkin (and, perhaps, con-
stitutional theorists more generally) (p. 18), Graber complains, 
engage in "[ o ]bsessive searches for 'correct' answers to past and 
present contested questions of constitutional law [that] are po-
litically futile, even when possible jurisprudentially" (p. 3).4 His 
criticism of these theorists is that, mired as they are in philoso-
phical abstractions, they misunderstand fundamentally the 
worldly politics of the genesis and nature of constitutional gov-
ernments. 
"Powerful social groups," Graber, the social scientific em-
piricist, instructs: 
are unlikely to accept any constitutional arrangement, clear or 
ambiguous, that they believe undermines their vital interests 
and fundamental values. Constitutions settle political conflicts 
successfully in the short run by providing pre-existing answers 
to contested political questions. They successfully settle po-
3. Hence. Graber's ostensible suhject: "the problem of constitutional evil." which 
"concerns the practice and theory of sharing civic space with people committed to evil 
practices or pledging allegiance to a constitutional text and tradition saturated with con-
cessions to evil" (p. 1 ). 
4. Here. Graber insists that the inherently political nature of constitutions may not 
be overcome bv even the most dexterous-and intellectually successful-efforts at inter-
pretation. Sub~equently. however. Graber seems to back away from this position. em-
phasizing instead for issues that count. there are likely to be multiple plausible "correct" 
answers ("When political controversies have long excited a constitutional community. 
the central legal claims of all prominent participants will be well grounded in institu-
tional. historical. aspirational. or other constitutional logics" (p. 4 ).): See also p. 17: 
"Constitutional law is almost always structurally incapable of generating the clear right 
answer that might resolve hotly disputed constitutional questions. When a relatively en-
during constitutional controversy divides a society. every position that enjoys substantial 
political support rests on plausible constitutional foundations."). On this point. m the 
end. the book is inconsistent. 
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litical conflicts in the long run by creating a constitutional 
politics that consistently resolves contested questions of con-
stitutional law in ways that most crucial political actors find 
acceptable (p. 3). 
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Such territory is, thus, by its very nature, inhospitable to perfec-
tionism. 
There is much to this critique. But one of the most interest-
ing consequences of taking this emrirical, social scientific cri-
tique to its logical conclusion is that (in Graber's hands, at least), 
this New York Yankee arrives at the most vigorous defense of 
Calhounian and Confederate constitutional thought published in 
nearly half a century. As such, a book that started out canvassing 
the limitations and blindspots of contemporary constitutional 
theory ends up unwittingly shedding considerable light on the 
limitations and blindspots of contemporary empirical political 
science. Potentially then-and in ways that the author doesn't 
always grapple with- this is a very deep book. 
II. GRABER AS POLITICAL SCIENTIST 
Readers of Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional 
Evil should not be fooled by the absence of graphs, charts, and 
statistical regressions: Graber may be a law professor and law-
yer, but here he preens his bona fides as a card-carrying political 
scientist. The presuppositions of the book-and the base from 
which Graber sets out to attack the conventional wisdom of the 
legal academy, including constitutional theory's various interpre-
tative schools-are in (value free) social science. The argument 
Graber advances in Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional 
Evil depends upon a resolutely social scientific understanding of 
a Constitution as a bargain struck amongst self-seeking groups 
and individuals with diverse assumptions, goals, and interests. 
Each comes to that bargain, and signs on to it, with the under-
standing and expectation that over the long term, those goals 
and interests will be advanc~d through a life lived within the 
framework of that agreement.' 
5. In a lengthy discussion towards the book's end. Graber does re-consider these 
same issues in a lawyerly way from the perspective of various law of contracts frame-
works. including those discussing ··relational contracts."' Of course. the problem of ''evil"' 
inherent in this particular agreement also raises issues of contractual provisions against 
public policy and unconscionablility. This playful and engaging chapter taking up the 
question of the degree to which contractual agreements and constitutional agreements 
are analogous seem to have been appended as an afterthought to engage that slice of the 
legal academy allergic to the political scientific framework of the rest of the book (pp. 
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Such an approach, of course, is not premised on the notion 
that people are without values and moral convictions. Rather, in 
the distinctively modern spirit that underwrites contemporary 
social science, it brackets them. It takes the existence of diverse, 
divergent, and often deeply felt convictions about issues that 
matter to people a great deal as givens. More than that, it takes 
their existence as rendering political society necessitous in the 
first place. Only by entering into such an arrangement can such 
potentially warring individuals live together in peace. As such, to 
the modern sensibility, the bracketing of moral questions-
including, as here, matters of good and evil-is not shallowness 
or evasion: it is the point. 
The spirit of two social science moderns, the seminal Tho-
mas Hobbes, and the contemporary Arend Lijphart, loom over 
this book, though the first is not mentioned, and the latter only 
in passing (pp. 188-91). Hobbes was the first to argue rigorously 
and systematically that the primary purpose of founding a 
state-the Leviathan-was to exit a state of war and enter a 
condition of peace." It is perhaps less appreciated that, in fash-
ioning this argument concerning the origins and purpose of gov-
ernment, Hobbes became the progenitor of modern political sci-
ence. For ancient political thinkers, like Plato and Aristotle, the 
study of politics began with (inherently philosophical) questions 
of the nature of justice, virtue, and the good. Hobbes, instead, 
was animated by a single empirical, '"value free" question: he 
wanted to know, given actual, real-world conditions, what 
worked.7 
The contemporary political science comparativist, Arend 
Lijphart, is a Hobbesian in the sense that all empirically-oriented 
political scientists are Hobbesians: he brackets questions of jus-
tice, virtue, and the nature of the good, and asks what works. Li-
jphart is a student of constitutional arrangements, with a particu-
lar interest in what sort of constitutional arrangements "work" 
198--218). 
6. See THOMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHAN (1651). The social contract theorist who 
might have loomed over Graber's argument. but doesn't. is. of course. John Locke. 
Given that Locke combines the social contract with a theory of inherent natural rights 
whose denial justifies a refusal to enter into civil society-and a right of revolution-a 
Locke-haunted discussion of the constitutionalism of Lincoln. Taney. and Dred Scott. 
would force the author to contemplate matters from a perspective that transcends the 
pure empiricism that he endeavors to stick to here. See JOHN LOCKE. Two TREATISES 
OF CiVIL GOVERNMENT (1690). 
7. See LEO STRAUSS. NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). This orientation is 
evident in at least one important work of another early modern. NICCOLO 
MACHIAVELLI. THE PRINCE (1515). 
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successfully in divided or "plural" societies where there is pro-
nounced "segmental" disagreement, whatever its source, be it 
divergent pecuniary interests, or deep moral antagonisms. As for 
Hobbes, the desideratum for Lijphart is peace: successful consti-
tutional arrangements in plural societies are evident when the 
polity remains politically stable, unified, and functional. 
Graber's litmus test for the U.S. Constitution is Lijphart's 
litmus test for the world's many constitutions. Graber's analysis 
is premised on his understanding of antebellum American politi-
cal society as what Lijphart called a plural society. His under-
standing of the American Founding conceives of it as what Li-
jphart called a "consociational" bargain. What many will take as 
Graber's provocative sympathy for the constitutional arguments 
advanced by Roger Taney, Stephen Douglas, and the Constitu-
tional Union Party's 1860 presidential candidate John Bell, is 
premised on Lijphart's contention that plural polities stay to-
gether by bracketing deep moral disagreement, and by agreeing 
(as the American Founders did) to give significant minority in-
terests the power to veto initiatives that effect their vital inter-
ests-all features of consociationalism. 
In Graber's hands, then, the story of the Dred Scott case 
thus becomes a story about how, as conditions changed-the in-
vention of the cotton gin, the rise of abolitionism, and westward 
expansion-majoritarian understandings of the nature of the 
original constitutional bargain began to overpower the original 
consociational constitutional understandings, and a majoritarian 
political order threatened to eclipse a consociational one. In a 
consociational constitutional order, when a segmental interest 
(like the South) begins to lose-or perceives it is losing-its veto 
power over matters trenching upon its vital interests, it is point-
less to blame it for either the substance of its interests (inquiries 
into that are bracketed: if they consider it important, constitu-
tionally speaking, it is), or for its decision to exit the political or-
der altogether (which, so far as consociationalism is concerned, 
is a "right" in the value-free sense that it can be done). The 
measure of the success of the consociational order is whether it 
fell apart or not. This one did: therefore, what the Union side did 
must have violated the ( consociational) spirit of the original 
Constitution. Lincoln's constitutional understandings took insuf-
ficient cognizance of the consociational nature of the original 
constitutional bargain, something that Douglas and Bell under-
stood better than Lincoln did. It is this that wins them Graber's 
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high praise, and merits the devaluation of Lincoln as a constitu-
tional thinker. 
III. THE CONSOCIATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 
With a few exceptions, scholars of domestic American con-
stitutionalism have not considered our constitutional arrange-
ments from the perspective of comparative political scientists 
who study the failures and successes of constitutions around the 
world.~ And the possibility that our original constitutional under-
standings might best be understood as consociational has figured 
hardly at all. A brief introduction to consociationalism, by way 
of the work of Arendt Lijphart, would thus be apt. 
The core issue that the consociational paradigm addresses is 
the problem that "it may be difficult, but it is not at all impossi-
ble to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a 
plural society."9 The question is how to succeed in such an en-
deavor. On the basis of empirical evidence, Lijphart argues, the 
road to success is paved with constitutional consociationalism. 
Consociational democracy can be defined in terms of four 
characteristics. The first and most important element is gov-
ernment by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all sig-
nificant segments of the plural society. This can take several 
forms, such as a grand coalition cabinet in a Parliamentary 
system, a "grand" council or committee with important advi-
sory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other 
top officeholders in a presidential system. The other three ba-
sic elements of consociational democracy are (1) the mutual 
veto or "concurrent majority" rule, which serves as an addi-
tional protection of vital minority interests, (2) proportional-
ity as the principle standard of political representation, civil 
service appointments, and the allocation of public funds, and 
(3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its 
own internal affairs. 1" 
"Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of con-
sociational democracy." 11 Governing takes place through elite 
K But see WALTER MURPHY. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2006); MARK 
BRANDON. FREE IN THE WORLD (1998): STEPHEN ELKIN, RECONSTRUCTING THE 
COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC (2006). 
9. ARENDT LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 1 (1977) (hereinafter. 
LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY). 
10. !d. at 25. 
11. /d.atl. 
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bargaining. It involves not government by majority vote (which 
requires losing minorities to lump losing votes, even if they are 
on matters which, to them, are matters of deep concern). but in-
stead by government through a grand coalition- which Lijphart 
I' 
calls "coalescent" or "consensus" government. -
The power of mutual veto is a crucial feature of consocia-
tional arrangements: 
Decisions have to be made in grand coalitions, and when 
these are reached by majority vote. though the minority's 
presence in the coalition does give it a chance to present its 
case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may 
nevertheless be outvoted by the majority. When such deci-
sions affect the vital interests of a minority segment, such a 
defeat will be regarded as unacceptable and will endanger in-
tersegmental elite cooperation. 11 
Coalescent or consensus government thus naturally entails a 
considerable degree of segmental autonomy. 
Although he underplays the provenance of his conceptual 
framework, it is clear throughout this book that Graber is dis-
cussing the antebellum constitutional system in the United States 
in a thoroughly consociational language. This would make con-
siderable sense to Lijphart himself: after all, he cites the antebel-
lum U.S. as being a classic consociational order. There, a seg-
mental cleavage posed a threat to the stability of the system if its 
interests were not accommodated through consociational means. 
Even without hewing to explicit Calhounian theory of concur-
rent majority (which Lijphart cites repeatedly, and favorably, as 
one of the most highly developed discussions of a key mecha-
nism of consociational constitutionalism), federalism and a diffi-
cult-to-amend written constitution served as important instru-
ments for the minority veto, one of the pillars of 
consociationalism. 1 ~ 
12. !d. at 25. 
13. /d. at 36. 
14. AREND LIJPHART. DEMOCRACIES: PATI"ERNS OF MAJORITARIANISM AND 
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 33 (1999) (hereinafter. 
LIJPHART. PATTERNS]. For allusions to Calhoun's concurrent majority in Lijphart's 
work. see LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 30: AREND LIJPHART. THE POLITICS 
OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS 125 
(1968): LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 37. 125. 149. See JOHN C. CALHOUN. 
DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT ( 1849). 
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IV. REHABILITATING DRED SCOTT 
The vehicle Graber uses for driving home these conceptual 
points about the consociational origins of American constitu-
tionalism is Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857). In Dred Scott, the 
Court declared as a matter of law, first, that blacks are not citi-
zens, and, second, that, because slaves were the property of their 
owners under the protection of the Fifth Amendment's due 
process clause, Congress has no power to ban slavery in the terri-
tories.15 
Graber complains that most contemporary assessments of 
the Dred Scott decision are undertaken with contemporary legal 
agendas in mind that warp our understandings of constitutional 
history. These assessments, propagated by contemporary perfec-
tionists and originalists alike, assume that: 1) the Founders were 
"wise and virtuous," 2) slavery is evil; and, therefore, 3) Taney's 
opinion in Dred Scott sustaining it on originalist grounds must 
have been a fundamental misreading of the Founders' Constitu-
tion. Such assessments, in Graber's view, "[minimize] the extent 
to which the original Constitution accommodated that peculiar 
institution" (p. 22). 
This is something that Chief Justice Taney understood. 
Graber endeavors to prove that "Taney's constitutional claims in 
Dred Scott were well within the mainstream of antebellum con-
stitutional thought" (p. 28). He does so through extensive his-
torical research into the nature and content of those understand-
ings. Citing a cascade of antebellum state court opinions, for 
instance, Graber concludes that "The judicial denial of black 
citizenship reflected beliefs held by the overwhelming majority 
of antebellum jurists in both the North and the South. Virtually 
every state court that ruled on black citizenship before 1857 con-
cluded that free persons of color were neither state nor Ameri-
can citizens" (pp. 28-29). 
Taney's views on slavery and citizenship, moreover, were in 
the mainstream of Jacksonian and Democratic Party thought. 
And they were anticipated in formal opinions issued by the U.S. 
Attorney General (p. 30). Moreover, these understandings were 
not held by Democrats alone. Graber marshals a raft of contem-
poraneous declarations from northern officials, Republican and 
Whigs, expressly agreeing with Taney's view in Dred Scott that 
blacks could not be citizens. He notes that Lincoln himself, in his 
15. Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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debates with Stephen Douglas, refuses to criticize this aspect of 
Taney's opinion (p. 32). Even the harshest critics of Taney's 
opinion, like Susan B. Anthony, acknowledged that it reflected 
the widely held understandings of the time (p. 33). Graber con-
tends that Taney's much mocked argument that the fact that 
blacks had voted in the Founding era (cited by the vehement dis-
sents of Justices Curtis and McLean) did not, ipso facto, entail 
black citizenship was, historically, dead-on: non-citizen suffrage 
was common at the time, and politicians from across the political 
spectrum agreed that suffrage did not entail citizenship (p. 49). 
The story is similar when it comes to the power of Congress 
to ban slavery in the territories. Here, there was disagreement 
over the scope of Congress's powers from the outset. Graber ob-
serves that "Thirty years after ratification, all living Southern 
Framers maintained that they had not intended to vest Congress 
with the power to ban slavery in the territories, while the surviv-
ing Northern framers uniformly maintained they had intended to 
vest Congress with that power." Both, Graber argues, were plau-
sible interpretations of the 1787 Constitution (p. 66). Contempo-
rary efforts defending Congress's power to accomplish this on 
the basis of McCulloch v. Maryland's broad reading of the nec-
essary and proper clause, Graber claims, are anachronistic, read-
ing that decision more in light of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal 
than of Andrew Jackson's America (pp. 71-72). In reality, the 
scope of Congress's powers in this area is a matter to which the 
Framers either gave, or expressed, little thought (p. 73). Taney's 
arguments on these matters may not have been right. But there 
is little doubt they were familiar, common to their time, and 
plausible. 
However plausible these arguments may have been, given 
the depth of the conflict, was the (unelected) Court the right in-
stitution to resolve these questions? Many antebellum political 
actors certainly thought so, Graber explains: they repeatedly in-
sisted that the question was one that would be best resolved by 
the judiciary (pp. 33-35). 16 And many saw the Taney Court in 
particular as especially well-suited to resolving it. They looked at 
that Court-which was dominated by Southern unionists and 
conservative northerners-not as a tool of the slave power (as 
many today talk about it), but rather as a "remarkably centris[ t r 
institution, and the most likely venue for resolving contentious 
16. See also Mark A. Graber. The Non-Majoritiarian Difficulty: Legislative Defer-
ence to the Judiciary. 7 Snm. AM. POL. DEV. 35. 46--50 ( 1993 ). 
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sectional questions in a moderate. workable way (pp. 36-37). 
How centrist was the Court? Graber suggests that we decide by 
comparing its political temper. not to our own. but to that of 
other contemporaneous national institutions. He adduces a fair 
amount of evidence, for instance, that it was more centrist than 
the Congress of the same era. 
The implications of this research are potentially quite sig-
nificant. For. if Taney's opinions on these legal issues were well 
within the mainstream of their time then, even if we concede 
that Taney's reading of the Constitution was flat-out wrong (as 
Graber does not), we are led ineluctably to conclude that his 
Dred Scott opinion was neither arrogant nor activist-that it 
manifestly did not involve a judge willfully reading his own idio-
syncratic political views into law. In the context of the evidence 
adduced by Graber. Dred Scott becomes (to borrow Jeffrey 
Rosen's terms-though not his judgment about the Dred Scott 
case itself) a classicly "multilateralist" decision. 17 
But can we at least concede the Dred Scott was activist and 
infamous in its effects? Did Dred Scott create a political fire-
storm that hastened the disintegration of the Union? Graber in-
sists that that question must be answered by looking to the reac-
tions not of committed secessionists, but to those of peaceful 
unionists. Drawing on the previous work of historians, he finds 
no evidence that the decision led to any more votes for Republi-
cans which, in spiral of action and reactions, hastened the disso-
lution of the Union. In this regard, he fingers the Lecompton 
constitution, not Dred Scott, as the real culprit (pp. 40-41 ). 
17. That is (to borrow Jeffrey Rosen's nomenclature). the Dred Scott decision was a 
case of the Court acting ·'multilaterally." on the basis of considerable support in the pol-
ity for its constitutional understandings. JEFFREY ROSEN. THE MOST DEMOCRATIC 
BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006). As I noted in a brief review of 
Rosen's book-and as Graber's book makes evident as a case in point-even when the 
Court seems to be acting most preemptively (and. hence. in an "activist'" way), rather 
than simply inventing its arguments out of whole cloth. it is usually relying on some wide-
spread understandings held somewhere in the polity. This makes Rosen's model consid-
erably less useful than he supposes. The trick (and the trick Rosen adopts in his book) is 
to look hard for that support in areas that he likes, and to do a cursory search that fails to 
discover it in areas that he doesn't. See Ken I. Kersch. Review of Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America. 112 COMMENTARY 70-72 (Oct. 
2006). This point may be deepened. as Graber, drawing on the work of Rogers Smith, 
deepens it, by emphasizing the "multiple traditions" of liberalism. republicanism, and 
ascriptive Americanism simultaneously threading through American political thought 
throughout the country's history. All are available as anchors for political argument at 
most points in American history. Rogers M. Smith. Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and 
Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America. 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549-66 (1993). Rosen 
himself uses Dred Scott (and Roe v. Wade) as examples of classically "unilateralist" deci-
sions. 
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None of this, as noted above, means that Dred Scott was not 
"wrong" in a normative or moral sense, or (relatedly) as a matter 
of interpretive method: on an issue of such deep moral import, 
shouldn't the Court's justices (as today's aspirationalist theorists 
might suggest) have followed their hearts and not their heads, 
and- in this case at least, involving fundamental issues of bond-
age and freedom-recurred to their own sense of morality and 
justice in interpreting the broad provisions and spirit of the Con-
stitution? Here, once again, Graber spies an anachronism, one 
which unmasks the wonted solipsism of contemporary constitu-
tional theorists. All the evidence suggests that had the justices 
hearing the Dred Scott case been committed to aspirationalism, 
Chief Justice Taney's majority in Dred Scott would actually have 
swelled even larger. The historical record is clear, Graber in-
structs his contemporaries, that even Justice Curtis of Massachu-
setts, who wrote one of the case's famed dissents, was a commit-
ted racist, and evinced considerable sympathy for slavery. In 
other words, white supremacy was the aspirational position for 
these judges. "The aspirational critique of Dred Scott,'' Graber 
writes, "is at bottom based on the silly proposition that South-
erners fought to the death to preserve what they know in their 
hearts was a necessary evil. Slavery was embedded in the way of 
life that most Southerners and some Northerners thought intrin-
sically valuable and expressive of the highest constitutional aspi-
rations" (p. 83). Put otherwise, slavery's proponents and defend-
ers in antebellum America were aspirationalists: they had racist, 
and white supremacist aspirations. 1x 
Graber uses these facts as an opportunity to criticize virtu-
ally any sort of constitutional method as a hedge against bad-
even evil- political results. He explains: 
all forms of constitutional logic are capable of yielding evil re-
sults. Institutional arguments yield evil results whenever 
elected officials and popular majorities support evil laws. His-
torical arguments yield evil results whenever constitutional 
framers and ratifiers constitutionalize evil practices. Aspira-
tional arguments yield evil results whenever constitutional 
framers have evil constitutional values (p. 83). 
Thus, approaching Dred Scott through the prism of contem-
porary academic debates about the best way to interpret the 
constitutional text is folly. Graber argues that we would gain a 
richer, and more accurate understanding of the case, and the 
18. See Smith. supra note 17. 
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constitutional questions it raised, if we look at it through the 
prism of the framework of government that was set up by the 
original constitution, and then consider how well these institu-
tions functioned in resolving disputes in a changing polity devel-
oping, over time, economically, geographically, socially, and po-
litically. The real problem-for which the Dred Scott case 
became a flashpoint-was not one of erroneous interpretations 
but rather one of "flawed constitutional institutions" (p. 91). 
Of course, this does not free Graber from the burden of in-
terpretation. It requires that he advance his own interpretation 
of the purposes that the institutions created at the founding were 
designed to achieve. "The Constitution of 1787," he writes, 
"sought to secure a balance of sectional power by establishing 
institutions thought to give both the free and slave states a prac-
tical veto on national policy .... The framers understood that 
slavery might be restrained or even abolished under the constitu-
tional arrangements agreed upon in 1787, but they believed that 
would happen only when many Southerners thought such poli-
cies desirable" (p. 92). 
The core principle of the original Constitution, for Graber, 
the social scientist. was bisectionalism. The constitutional foun-
ders "were more concerned with devising institutions that would 
facilitate bisectional agreements on slavery policy than with de-
termining the substance of those agreements in advance. The 
more perfect union crafted in Philadelphia primarily relied on a 
constitutional politics constructed to yield policies that moder-
ates in both the North and the South would support" (p. 96). As 
such, they created not- as the constitutional theorists insist-
constitutional law, but rather the framework for a constitutional 
politics. "[T]he framers bequeathed to their descendents a set of 
constitutional institutions they hoped would facilitate future 
bargaining over the constitutional status of slavery. Constitu-
tional exegesis was supposed to resemble renegotiation as much 
as interpretation'' (p. 171 ). 
In agreeing to the 1787 Constitution, "Northerners were as-
suaged by the paucity of explicit textual protections for slavery, 
Southerners by their expected control of the national govern-
ment" (p. 109). "Poor communication between different regions 
prevented most participants in state ratification conventions 
from fully realizing the different interpretations of the constitu-
tional compromises over slavery being advanced during the rati-
fication process in noncontiguous states" (p. 110). "The Consti-
tution drafted in Philadelphia was interpreted as sufficiently 
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proslavery to be ratified in the South and sufficiently antislavery 
to be ratified in the North" (p. 12). 
The test of the wisdom of these constitutional arrangements 
was in the living. The constitutional order framed at Philadelphia 
initially functioned fairly well. "National parties [whose rise was 
neither predicted nor desired by the Founders] became the pri-
mary vehicle for preserving the original constitutional commit-
ment to bisectionalism." Underlying the original constitutional 
bargain, Graber contends, was an understanding that "crucial ... 
political elites in both the free and slave states had to approve all 
constitutional settlements on slavery issues" (pp. 3, 92, 115, 140-
44). 
Southerners indeed were dominant in national politics, ini-
tially, and, when they were dominant, they favored the expan-
sion national power (pp. 116-17).19 As the Louisiana Purchase 
manifests, they were also initially quite supportive of westward 
expansion (pp. 118-20). Things changed, however. Over time, 
settlers unexpectedly flocked to the Northwest rather than the 
Southwest (p. 92). "[E]very decade between 1820 and 1860 wit-
nessed an increase in the relative population and political power 
of the North" (p. 126) And in what Graber calls "the new consti-
tutional politics of slavery," it became increasingly clear to all 
that the region that controlled the west would control the na-
tional government (p. 136). That region, it also became increas-
ingly clear, relatively early on, would be the North. 
Nevertheless, between 1820 and 1850, under what Graber 
calls the "modified constitution," the slaveholding republic was 
maintained by the "combination of representatives with South-
ern sensitivities, presidents with bisectional coalitions, and pro-
slavery majorities on the federal bench" (p. 149). "The Jackson-
ian Party system and the Jacksonian Democratic Party were the 
primary means by which mid-nineteenth century Americans pre-
served their original commitment to bisectionalism," he writes. 
The national party system "fostered cooperation between free-
and slave-state politicians'' (p. 144). "Public policy under the 
Jacksonian regime was both republican and proslavery because 
politicians in the free states gained necessary Southern support 
19. The degree to which southerners actually favored national power at this time is 
perhaps overstated by Graber here. though his drawing attention to the significant in-
stances in which they did is a helpful corrective to the conventional wisdom that they 
were unalloyed states-righters from the beginning. 
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for their nonslavery interests only by providing certain protec-
tions for slaveholders" (p. 145). 
As time went on, free sailers and abolitionists came to see, 
understand. and execrate this modus vivendi (pp. 149-50). Soon, 
there developed a "real debate ... over whether the original 
constitutional commitment to bisectionalism should be modified 
or abandoned" (p. 13) The Wilmot Proviso, and the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo were arrows aimed at the heart of the or-
der's bisectional assumptions. But they fell without making a di-
rect hit on their target. Nevertheless, "balance rule" power-
sharing arrangements continued to unravel as demographic 
trends led to persisting free state control over the House of Rep-
resentatives and, in time, the Presidency, and as slaveholders di-
vided amongst themselves by "party, ideology, and region" (pp. 
5, 143-44). In an ominous sign, sectional parties developed. 
By the time of Dred Scott, the stresses on the old order were 
intense. The origins of the Dred Scott case were in efforts by 
party leaders to preserve the bisectional status quo constitutional 
order-and not in the inclination of the Court to resolve the 
question by fiat. "The national party leaders who foisted respon-
sibility for slavery on the federal judiciary," Graber explains, 
"attempted to maintain bisectionalism by vesting veto power 
over slavery policies in the only remaining national institution 
with a Southern majority" -the Supreme Court (p. 13). 
What else were they to do? The original design of the Con-
stitution practically foreordained that it would be left to the 
Court, rather than other institutions, to seek to resolve this in-
cendiary matter. Over time, Article II shunted the moderates on 
the question out of contention for the Presidency. For instance, 
Graber observes that Millard Fillmore, a committed New York 
constitutionalist who might have been the Whig candidate for 
President in 1852, and won with the sort of bisectional support 
that would have promoted sectional compromise, was done in by 
Article II. Graber notes that Fillmore had a lot of support in 
many states, but majority support only in one, which earned him 
3 percent of the electoral college vote, while he had the support 
of 22 percent of the voters. Those candidates who could have 
appealed to the more compromising median voter-which they 
hadn't the incentive to do under the prevailing rules of our con-
stitutional system-were similarly frustrated (pp. 154-55). 
Stephen Douglas and John Bell were presidential candidates 
who appealed to the median voter, but who lost out given these 
rules (p. 166). Under these arrangements, come the 1850s, the 
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Taney Court was arguably the national government's most rep-
resentative institution. 
Graber contends that the candidate for president in 1860 
who remained truest to the spirit of Constitution's original spirit 
was not Lincoln-who insisted, wrongly, that the framers in-
tended to place slavery "in the course of ultimate extinction" 
and, accordingly, ''promised to accommodate no more evil than 
constitutionally necessary"- but rather John Bell, "who prom-
ised bisectional solutions to contested constitutional questions," 
with the aim of "preserve[ing] the conditions under which slav-
ery might have been abandoned peacefully" (p. 5).~0 As such, 
Graber concludes, "The Constitution caused the Civil War by 
failing to establish institutions that would facilitate the constitu-
tional politics necessary for the national government to make 
policies acceptable to crucial elites in both sections of the coun-
try" (p. 167). 
For Graber, it is precisely what many people praise about 
Abraham Lincoln that he finds most damning: the fact that Lin-
coln repeatedly declared slavery a moral and constitutional evil. 
This status as evil, Lincoln believed, "obligated slave-state citi-
zens to acquiesce whenever Republican constitutional majorities 
interpreted ... constitutional ambiguities as sanctioning antislav-
ery policies" (p. 173). This, however, was a fundamental mis-
reading of the nature of the Constitution, whose nature was con-
sociational, and. whose abiding founding commitment was to 
bisectionalism. 
V. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Strangely enough for a scholar whose other recent writings 
tout a "regime politics" approach to U.S. constitutional devel-
opment, Graber's analysis of the nature of America's constitu-
tional regime stops dead in its tracks with the election of 1860: in 
this book, Graber says practically nothing about what came af-
ter. For a work of history, which would be limited in temporal 
scope, this ordinarily would not be a problem. For a work of 
constitutional theory, however, it is. Without any consideration 
of the new constitutional nation that arose in the Civil War's af-
termath-the new constitutional regime-it is difficult to make 
20. Quoting Abraham Lincoln, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 18 (Roy P. Basler, ed .. 1953). 
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any useful assessment of the virtues of Abraham Lincoln's con-
stitutionalism. This is because, to be counted a successful consti-
tutional thinker, Lincoln's reputation must rest in considerable 
part not only on how, looking backwards, he described the con-
stitutional republic, but in how the nation realized his under-
standings after the war. Lincoln's most enduring success, after 
all, was to forge a constitutional vision that purported not only to 
comprehend the past, but to make the future. 
There may be lots of talk about development in this book-
economic, political, geographical. But, in Graber's hands, all that 
development plays out against the backdrop of a constitutional-
ism that is determinatively-perhaps definitionally-static. It is 
true that Graber provides for the possibility that an originally 
consociational constitution might develop into something differ-
ent. 21 But he insists that, if it does so, it must be through-and 
only through- the means set out by a rigidly adhered to conso-
ciationalist theory- that is, by bisectional methods.22 In this. 
Graber is, in his own way, as rigid as the starchiest of conserva-
tive originalists. 
Put otherwise. Graber makes this a book about fidelity 
rather than (as we might expect from a scholar committed to a 
regimes perspective) about transitions. Douglas and Bell were, 
similarly, preoccupied with fidelity-which is why Graber is so 
fond of them. Lincoln is a much more complicated case-which 
is why pretty much everyone else is so fond of him. Clearly, Lin-
coln is setting out new constitutional understandings (while, at 
the same time, drawing deeply upon the Constitution and 
thought of the American past). And the war came. 
Even if we once had a consociational constitution, or a con-
stitution that a key group of southern segmental elites under-
stood as having been consociational, the Union victory in the 
Civil War brought the consociational period of American consti-
21. Lijphart provided for the possibility that consociationalism. in some cases. could 
be a developmental concept: it could succeed. and render itself superfluous. LIJPHART. 
DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 2. 
22. As such. the rules of consociationalism are to Graber's Constitution what the 
Article V amendment process are to today's originalists. Regarding the means to change. 
Graber argues-briefly. and in passing-that Lincoln was too precipitous. If he had un-
derstood and acknowledged the bisectional foundations of U.S. Constitutional arrange-
ments. as did Stephen Douglas and John Bell, the sectional disagreements over slavery in 
the territories might have been worked out over time. gradually. and peacefully (this 
throw-awav counterfactual is asserted. not argued). Instead. Lincoln took the more radi-
cal (and. u'!timatelv. disastrous) course of insisting on altogether new constitutional un-
derstandings-of i~sisting on the amendment of the Constitution by means outside of its 
(implicitly) stipulated procedures. 
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tutionalism to a close. Or put, otherwise (to transpose what 
seems novel in this book into the eminently familiar). the Civil 
War essentially brought the Webster-Hayne debate to a close: 
the Whigs (and the Republicans) won. 23 This being the case, and 
given that Graber's stance is rather statically originalist, one is 
lead to the conclusion that, so far as the United States is con-
cerned, the consociational starting point he adopts here for 
thinking about constitutions amounts to little more than an in-
teresting foray into antiquarianism. To be sure, there are other 
countries around the world that, today, might be best described 
as sectional and plural. But, the U.S. after 1865-after Lincoln-
should not properly be counted amongst them. 
For a book that aims to speak to contemporary (American) 
constitutional theorists, this is no small matter. Given where the 
book ends, Graber doesn't effectively address the question of 
whether or not, even if we accept his controversial characteriza-
tion of the American constitutional founding as consociational, 
the constitutional order we live in today is consociational. If it 
isn't, and if the consociational Constitution Graber describes 
died in the Civil War, Graber's rejoinder to perfectionist (and 
other) constitutional theorists is seriously undercut. For pre-
sumably these theorists are offering their views on the best way 
to interpret our Constitution today-and not the best method for 
interpreting the Constitution in 1857. At the end of this book, 
Graber asks that we approach our own present day constitutional 
disputes as if we were voting for John Bell over Abraham Lin-
coln, because John Bell properly understood the antebellum 
constitution consociationally. But, at bottom-and remarkably-
what he is asking us to do is interpret the Constitution today as if 
the Civil War had never taken place. Graber has made no argu-
ment, and adduced no evidence whatsoever, for the proposition 
that this is a sensible way to think about our own present day 
constitutional disputes. Surely it is no accident that we today are 
more appreciative of Lincoln's constitutionalism than John 
Bell's.24 
23. See ROGAN KERSH. DREAMS OF A MORE PERFECT UNION (2001): see also 
Graber (p. 60). 
24. Lijphart characterizes the U.S. svstem as an ··intermediate form" between the 
majoritarian "Westminster Model" and th~ consociational "consensus model." He argues 
that "majoritarian democracy is especially appropriate for. and works best in. homoge-
neous societies. whereas consensus democracy is more suitable for pluralist societies ... 
He notes that "[I]n a political system with clearly separate and potentially hostile popula· 
twn segments. virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes. and strict ma-
jority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of the system ... Majoritarian systems are 
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Well, some people are more appreciative of Lincoln. Draw-
ing upon the very best understandings of contemporary social 
science, we can, today, appreciate the folly of Abraham Lincoln. 
Like Graber, Lijphart, the consociational empiricist, is full of 
warnings about the path that Lincoln actually took: 
Although the replacement of segmental loyalties by a com-
mon national allegiance appears to be a logical answer to the 
problems posed by a plural society, it is extremely dangerous 
to attempt it. Because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties, 
any effort to eradicate them not only is quite unlikely to suc-
ceed. especially in the short run, but may well be counterpro-
ductive and may stimulate segmental cohesion and interseg-
mental violence rather than national cohesion. The 
consociational alternative avoids this danger and offers a 
mor~ promising method f<;>~ achie~in&, both democracy and a 
considerable degree of political umty.-
Graber's argument leads ineluctably to the conclusion that, 
were he advised by card-carrying members of the American Po-
litical Science Association stocked to the brim with empirical 
studies of the conditions for the maintenance of consociational 
constitutional systems in plural societies, Lincoln would have 
been told in no uncertain terms not to do what he did. Similarly, 
extensively cited APSA comparativists, Graber instructs us, 
could have told the intransigent foes of the expansion of slavery 
westward (not to mention those committed to abolishing it 
where it actually existed) that they were on a dangerous mission. 
What they were engaged in was likely to lead to calamity. Since 
we can predict the likely outcome, given the prevailing condi-
tions (social science) and since peace is the paramount value 
(Hobbes), ergo, Taney and Douglas and Bell were right, and 
Lincoln was wrong. 
Was the original U.S. Constitutional order consociational or 
majoritarian? This depends on whether or not American society 
able to transcend division-though perhaps not the deepest-through the mechanisms of 
cross·cutting cleavages. and through the assumption that power will alternate between 
segments over time. When a single issue-like slavery-grows in significance to the point 
where the segmenting grows close to becoming uni-dimensional. and where members of 
the minority segment lose faith in the possibilities for the alteration of power over time. 
the constitutional svstem begins to break down. LIJPHART. PATTERNS. supra note 14. at 
3: LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 28-29. This simply pushes the question back 
a step. and asks whether the U.S. is (or was) best understood as a homogenous or a plu-
ralist society. Graber insists that. prior to the Civil War. it was essentially-or. at least. 
potentially-plural. Lincoln insisted it was essentially homogenous. 
25. LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 24. 
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as it is, and as it was, is better described as ''homogenous" or 
"plural.'' Which is it? Was the fact that we had a Civil War evi-
dence of a constitutional failure? Or was the real failure in 
rooted either in the institution of slavery itself, or (as the old "ir-
repressible conflict" school of Civil War studies-whose argu-
ments Graber echoes repeatedly here) in irreconcilable sectional 
differences that no initial agreement could have navigated effec-
tively?c" In the face of profound evil, is the fact that a nation re-
sorts the war a sign of failure or of virtue? Is war ever justified? 
Graber the constitutionalist makes a valiant-if not neces-
sarily noble-effort to move beyond these inherently normative 
judgments through recourse to modern, empirical social science. 
While the fruits of his effort were instructive, however, it was ul-
timately a lost cause. 
26. This outlook was succinctly summarized by the historian F.W. Owsley in his 
contribution to the important statement of the Nashville agrarians. /'1/ Take My Stand. 
published in 1930: "This agrarian society had its own interests. which in almost all re-
spects diverged from the interests of the industrial system of the North. The two sections. 
North and South. had entered the revolution against the mother country with the full 
knowledge of the opposing interests of their societies .... [T]hey had joined together un-
der the Constitution fully conscious that there were ... united two divergent economic 
and social systems. two civilizations. in fact. The two sections were evenly balanced in 
population and in the number of states. so that at the time there was no danger of either 
section's encroaching upon the interests of the other. This balance was clearly under-
stood. Without it a union would not have been possible. Even with the understanding 
that the two sections would continue to hold this even balance. the sections were very 
careful to define and limit the powers of the federal government lest one section with its 
peculiar interests should get control of the national government and use the powers of 
that government to exploit the other section .... But the equilibrium was impossible un-
der expansion and growth. One section with its peculiar system of society would at one 
time or another become dominant and control the national government and either ex-
ploit the other section or else fail to exercise the functions of government for its positive 
benefit. Herein lies the irrepressible conflict. the eternal struggle between the agrarian 
South and the commercial and industrial North to control the government either in its 
own interest or. negatively. to prevent the other section from controlling it in its interests. 
Lincoln and Seward and the radical Republicans clothed the conflict later in robes of mo-
rality by making it appear that the "house divided against itself" and the irrepressible 
conflict which resulted from this division marked a division between slavery and free-
dom. Slavery ... was part of the agrarian system. but only one element and noi the essen-
tial one. To say that the irrepressible conflict was between slavery and freedom is either 
to fail to grasp the nature and magnitude of the conflict. or else to make use of deliberate 
deception by employing a shibboleth to win the uninformed and unthinking to the sup-
port of a sinister undertaking." F. W. Owsley. The Irrespressible Conflict. in TwELVE 
SOUTHERNERS. I'LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN TRADITION 
24-25 (Louisiana State University Press. 1977 (1930]). In DRED SCOTT AND THE 
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL. Graber tracks this argument in most of its essen-
tials-though. unlike the adherents to the Irrepressible Conflict thesis-he does place 
slavery at the heart of the Southern system. 
